Working Papers
Trading Gifts for Transparency: Insider Giving and the SEC
Dissertation — Solo-authored
This study examines the effects of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) recent
modernization of insider trading regulations on corporate insiders' stock donation behavior.
The updated rules governing gifts of stock are designed to curb the manipulative use of
material nonpublic information (MNPI) in insider giving and to enhance transparency in
reporting. Utilizing data on stock donations reported by insiders to the SEC, I document
a significant decline in the likelihood that insiders continue to give following the SEC's
amendment. This reduction cannot be fully attributed to a reduction in seemingly manipulative
donation practices, as I find that insiders who are least likely to strategically time their
donations also exhibit a decrease in their giving behavior. This suggests that the SEC's
recent regulatory changes have had broader effects, not only deterring misconduct but also
attenuating legitimate charitable giving. Collectively, these findings document the effects
of a recent regulatory intervention and shed light on the donation activities of corporate
insiders, an important group of market participants.
Key Insights
- SEC's 2023 modernization of insider trading regulations led to a substantial reduction in both the likelihood and value of stock donations by corporate insiders
- The decline in giving is driven by heightened perceived litigation risk following the amendment, not by any improvement in the timeliness of reporting
- Returns following donations show no significant change after the amendment, suggesting manipulative donors were not, proportionally, affected any more than non-manipulative donors
Setting the Bar Early: Investor Relations and the Path to Meeting or Beating Analyst Expectations
With Kimball Chapman, Greg Miller, and Jed Nielson
Meeting or beating the analyst consensus is among the most consequential recurring
outcomes for a firm, and managing analyst expectations is one of the principal means of
achieving it. Given the role of investor relations (IR) in overseeing communication with
analysts and investors, we examine its contribution to firms' ability to meet or beat
analyst expectations and the mechanisms through which it does so. We find that firms with
a dedicated internal IR function are significantly more likely to meet or beat the analyst
consensus. IR firms issue guidance more frequently and calibrate it conservatively,
setting targets below eventual earnings and aligning analyst expectations early in the
quarter. In contrast to the walk-down pattern documented in prior work, IR firms that
guide exhibit net upward intra-quarter revisions. We find no evidence that IR firms rely
more on real or accrual-based earnings management and no evidence of marginal beating by
a penny. As investor relations officer (IRO) tenure lengthens, attainment relies less on
formal guidance, while the upward revision pattern persists, consistent with accumulated
credibility substituting for public commitment. Collectively, our results suggest that IR
capabilities allow firms to meet analyst expectations by calibrating them conservatively
from the outset, avoiding both the intervening disappointment of a late correction and
the need for earnings manipulation.
Key Insights
- Firms with a dedicated internal investor relations function are significantly more likely to meet or beat analyst consensus estimates
- IR firms guide more frequently and conservatively, setting targets below eventual earnings and aligning expectations early in the quarter rather than relying on late walk-downs
- As IRO tenure lengthens, firms rely less on formal guidance while still exhibiting upward revisions—consistent with accumulated credibility substituting for public commitment
SEC Politicization and Shareholder Voice: Evidence from the No-Action Letter Process
With Lindsey Gallo, Kendall Lynch, and Greg Miller
We examine the increasing politicization of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
through the lens of the no-action letter process for shareholder proposals. Using historical
no-action letter decisions from 2009–2014, we develop a text-based prediction model to
establish a benchmark for SEC decision-making precedent. Applying this model to shareholder
proposals from 2017–2024, we find that exclusion decisions under Staff Legal Bulletin
(SLB) 14I were largely consistent with historical precedent. In contrast, decisions following
SLB 14L became substantially more permissive, particularly for environmental and social (E&S)
proposals. Although this shift expanded shareholder access to corporate proxy statements,
proposals that would have been excluded under historical precedent receive significantly
lower shareholder support. Moreover, following SLB 14L, even E&S proposals that would have
reached the proxy statement under historical precedent experience declines in shareholder
support relative to governance proposals. Collectively, our findings highlight a potential
tradeoff between two dimensions of shareholder voice in an era of increased politicization:
greater access to the proxy statement driven by policy preferences does not necessarily
translate into greater shareholder support and may coincide with reduced support for
proposals that would have reached shareholders under prior regulatory regimes.
Key Insights
- SEC exclusion decisions under SLB 14I were largely consistent with historical precedent, while decisions following SLB 14L became substantially more permissive—particularly for E&S proposals
- Proposals that would have been excluded under historical precedent receive significantly lower shareholder support once they reach the proxy statement
- Following SLB 14L, even E&S proposals that would have reached the proxy under prior precedent see declining support relative to governance proposals
Hybrid Governance Models and Firm Financial Outcomes
Solo-authored — Recipient of Emeritus Ph.D. Fellowship Award (2024) for most outstanding second-year research paper across the Ross School of Business
This study investigates the impact of hybrid governance models on firms' financial outcomes.
Using certified B Corps, a specific set of legally structured benefit corporations, I find
that firms' costs increase following the adoption of hybrid governance models. Findings
suggest that firms that prioritize their social mission more actively in their everyday
business activities incur lower operating costs. In line with prior literature, I replicate
findings of no strong change in firms' revenues. Coupled with rising costs, I show that
firms' net income decreases following the transition. One benefit of the hybrid governance
model I document is increased private equity funding. Given the recent push for for-profit
firms to pursue social missions, these findings highlight the effects firms might realize
when pursuing multiple goals.
Key Insights
- Firms adopting B Corp certification experience increased costs, particularly in SG&A expenses
- Firms with higher B Impact Assessment scores integrate social missions more efficiently, showing lower operational overhead
- Despite reduced profitability, B Corps attract significantly more private equity investment in the years following certification
Works in Progress
External Monitors of Internal Controls: Evidence from Caremark Claims
With Greg Miller — Data Collection Phase